Representation and Reality

图书介绍

   
Putnam here revises the functionalist view of mind that he formerly espoused. He retains the belief that, in principle, a machine and a person can work the same way when described at the relevant level of abstraction, yet he disavows the belief that mental states are functional statesthough granting that the former emerge from and may supervene upon the latter. Among the theses offered are that the criterion for sameness of meaning is actual interpretation practice; that mental states cannot be programs; that we cannot have a scientific theory of intentional phenomena; and that even if there were a kind of equivalence in the structure of computational states of physically possible organisms who share a belief, we could not define the equivalence. An important work in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Robert Hoffman, York Coll., CUNY
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.


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